Friday, May 6, 2022

Hermeneutics all the way down

It's been an eventful week in America. Breathless op-eds proclaim the end of democracy (one of an infinite number of such panics in half a decade), paranoid culture warriors decry creeping theocracy in their daytime delusions, the monsters have risen up from under the bed, from within the dark recesses of their closet, seeping into the trembling pillars of the republic. Never do those who continually cry wolf ever stop to wonder whether their own actions are chipping away at the foundations of this young nation. That would be too much. The unimpeachable conviction that one is right, and that one is on the right side of history, is too alluring to resist. What is democracy in the shadow of megalothymia? 

In any event, theocracy has not come to this country and it has not been turned back to the stone age. What the leaked draft of the majority opinion in Dobbs v Jackson has done is simply remove from the Supreme Court an aggrandized power (think James Madison in Federalist No. 48: "Power is of an encroaching nature") and returned it back to the states. There are tricky issues here, issues of constitutional interpretation, of the nature of federalism and the balance between national and state power. But the one thing that should be made clear is that to strip abortion of its status as a protected constitutional right is not the same as to outlaw it. The political battle over abortion does not end here, it has merely entered a new phase. What has been stemmed here, however, is a particular jurisprudential mode of interpretation. Progressive living constitutionalism, birthed in the early 20th century by reformists like Louis Brandeis and Woodrow Wilson, has run up against the limits of its reach after a half-century of stunning success. It was a broad attempt to re-engineer social mores from the top-down. But what was it? And what stopped it? 

It would not be unfair to look at Griswold v Connecticut as the beginning of this long march. In it, the Supreme Court, headed at that time by Earl Warren, determined that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which reads that no one shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without "due process of law", in fact confers a substantive right to privacy. Although the word "privacy" fails to appear in the Constitution, it was suggested by the majority opinion that unenumerated rights exist as "penumbras and emanations" of enumerated rights. This reading was used to declare a Connecticut state law barring access to contraceptives unconstitutional. Through this derivation, the right to privacy was used to extend constitutional protections to sodomy, gay marriage, and eventually abortion. 

Penumbras and emanations are clearly conceptually vacuous. They are the tenuous thread upon which endlessly unenumerated rights can be declared and ordained. They, in essence, provide legal carte blanche to whichever enterprising activist judge would like to impose their preferred points-of-view upon public life. This is the reasoning that Justice Alito uses to overturn Roe and Casey in Dobbs. The threat that such reasoning will be used to license further excesses which have no basis in the legal tradition or national history makes such a reading of the Fourteenth Amendment intolerable and unacceptable. And so it is. 

The fury over abortion is bad enough, but this strikes at deeper issues about the nature and extent of federalism. Justice Goldberg, one of the judges presiding over Griswold, invoked not only the fourteenth amendment but the ninth in his supportive opinion. The ninth amendment is notorious in asserting that enumeration of particular rights shall not be construed as limiting others that might be retained by the people. He approvingly quotes Alexander Hamilton on Federalist No. 84, who writes:

I go further and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and in the extent in which they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed constitution, but would even be dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to powers which are not granted, and, on this very account, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted. For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to do? Why, for instance, should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed? I will not contend that such a provision would confer a regulating power; but it is evident that it would furnish, to men disposed to usurp, a plausible pretense for claiming that power.

Now, I might be blind. It's very possible that my rational faculties have dimmed. But it appears to me that this excerpt has nothing at all to do with the issue in question. The purpose of Federalist 84 was to argue against the inclusion of a Bill of Rights in the Constitution. Hamilton's chief concern is that the enumeration of particular rights, the limitation of the powers of the federal government, implies a transfer of powers from national government to the people. His fear was that a national government so inclined might one day in the future use this fact as a pretext to seize back rights that it supposes itself, on account of this transfer, to have at one time possessed. Hamilton's solution to this problem is to incorporate in the language of the Constitution itself a stronger recognition of popular sovereignty, for the federal government could not lose what had never been taken away. 

This never struck me as a particularly compelling argument and it doesn't appear to have swayed the Constitutional Convention. Furthermore, Hamilton goes on to speak about the freedom of the press. He says: 

        On the subject of the liberty of the press, as much as has been said, I cannot forbear adding a                remark or two: in the first place, I observe, that there is not a syllable concerning it in the                        constitution of this State; in the next, I contend, that whatever has been said about it in that of any         other State, amounts to nothing. What signifies a declaration, that "the liberty of the press shall be         inviolably preserved''? What is the liberty of the press? Who can give it any definition which would         not leave the utmost latitude for evasion? I hold it to be impracticable; and from this I infer, that            its security, whatever fine declarations may be inserted in any constitution respecting it, must                altogether depend on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the people and of the                            government. And here, after all, as is intimated upon another occasion, must we seek for the only           solid basis of all our rights. 

So provisions that provide for the protection of enumerated rights are empty, devoid of content. Where does that leave unenumerated rights? And what does that have to do with the point that Goldberg evidently seems to believe that Hamilton's line of reasoning supports, which is that the ninth amendment provides broad protections to rights not explicitly listed?  I don't see it. 

I imagine the vast majority of Americans, and certainly the world, are unaware that the Bill of Rights (once the Constitution had been ratified) was thought binding only on the federal government and not the states. Barron v Baltimore ruled that the states were not bound by the Bill of Rights. Furthermore, this ruling was not overturned in any subsequent case. It simply fell out of the collective consciousness. Why? Because in 1868 the American south was in ruins, the Democratic Party in disarray, and no political force was prepared to stop the ratification of the fourteenth amendment. 

So began a long process of legal incorporation, by which the bill of rights was applied slowly, selectively, and tempestuously to the states. The ninth amendment, I will point out, has not been explicitly incorporated in any case. So any ruling that bears on state laws ought not to, if we are being honest with ourselves, invoke the ninth amendment in defense of said ruling. But of course this has not happened. 

A theory of jurisprudence known as originalism grew up in response to these excesses and came to dominate the conservative legal movement. Put simply, originalism holds that the only proper purpose of constitutional interpretation is to recover the "original public meaning" of the Constitution at the time it was written. Methodologically, this renders originalism a positivist theory of legal interpretation, meaning that it is premised upon the separation of law and morality. Funnily enough, it was the question of antitrust law that heralded the shift of American jurisprudence away from judicial activism and towards a purely textualist reading of the law. Robert Bork, writing in The Antitrust Paradox, managed to shift judicial thinking away from Brandeis's evolutionary approach to "fact-based" interpretation by striking at the premise underlying his judgements on anti-trust law. Instead of making fundamentally political judgements about the proper level of competition in a market, judges must consider only the facts of consumer welfare, market share and price-levels as determinative in their adjudication.

The tech companies Bork was to decry in his later years benefited enormously from this shift away from "political" adjudication. The swing in the opposite direction has proved just as destructive, even as it has come to dominate every aspect of the judicial mainstream. The folly of originalism can be discerned in the dissenting opinion of Justice Black in Griswold v. Connecticut. Black had led the charge in separating the newly conceived neutral domain-notion of rights from an older conception that once stressed toleration within socially prescribed boundaries. To do this, he and like-minded justices had begun to lean more on arguments derived from a supposed “original public meaning” of the Constitution. Yet this attempt to uncover the original meaning of that document and impose it upon the present had led Black, curiously, to endorse the kind of state-action that this tactic had been expected to restrict. When considering the constitutionality of public power intruding upon private life, he had this to say: “I like my privacy as well as the next one, but I am nevertheless compelled to admit that government has a right to invade it unless prohibited by some specific constitutional provision" and critically that, "The court talks about a constitutional right to privacy as though there is some constitutional provision or provisions forbidding any law ever which might be passed to abridge the privacy of individuals. But there is not." 

All good so far, right? This is obviously worrying to those who consider "privacy" equivalent to "liberty" and who hold the unmitigated indulgence in both as a sacred cow in American political culture. But otherwise this is a strictly originalist reading of the Constitution. And yet we cannot escape the interpretative paradigm within which the Founders drafted the Constitution, for they were motivated primarily by political judgements. The originalist must fail, as all positivist legal theory must fail, because the Founders themselves were not positivists. They held substantive moral commitments, and they are vastly different from anything most originalists would likely be prepared to accept today. After all, where are the originalists defending blasphemy laws?

The first and second amendments are good examples of ways in which the meaning of our constitutional amendments have been subject to contestation and contingency. Today, the essence of the protection of "free speech" is held to be content and viewpoint-neutrality, meaning that it is held to be unconstitutional for the state to abandon neutrality in respect to substantive views and their content that make up the public square. Furthermore, it cannot impose a preferred viewpoint upon any individual or entity public and/or private. This seems intuitive enough. How else could free speech possibly be understood?

It will come as a shock to learn that these principles were not associated with expressive freedom in 1787. They would in fact have been utterly alien suggestions to all but the most fringe advocates. Freedom of speech in the early republic meant nothing more than a rule against prior restraints and a more bounded protection for well-intentioned communication on matters of public concern embedded within a socially-derived conception of what is actually in the public welfare. All ideas were not afforded equal protections within the commons. Pure "neutrality" was once substituted for something more akin to an embedded notion of "tolerance". Over time, state legislatures would come to adopt ends-means tests to rationally assess whether legislatures passing laws that restrict speech had properly identified a communicative threat to public order, health and/or morality. These latter concerns were the basis for the "police powers" afforded to the individual states, which sanctioned them with broad discretion to regulate private life in the interest of the public good. 

The "public good" is notoriously tricky to pin down. The first thought that comes to mind is that these are weasel words designed to surreptitiously smuggle totalitarian tendencies into the American context. But liberty is a broad and contested term, as most of the concepts we're juggling are. The Moldbuggian approach, for instance, misses the point. This line of thought is replete with loaded premises and assumptions that miss the proper aim of law: to proscribe commands and prohibitions for the sake of a just community. The neo-cameralist state does not take shared interest and right reason, properly understood as the exercise of virtue, to be the highest good and so of course this proposal is irrelevant to us. We don't even need to leave the rule of law behind to fix what is actually at issue. A regime impervious to the communicative harm of speech acts is a regime disconnected from the public sphere and therefore incapable of exercising any real control for the purposes of any good, private or public.

And so it is with the second amendment, perhaps as politically charged an issue as abortion. The great irony is that the right to bear arms was intended to build a public counterweight against the establishment of a permanent military structure. Public militias, drawn from the people, would more effectively handle the dangers of life on the frontier without the need to find recourse in the corruption and potential tyranny of a standing army. Today we see this concern has been flipped on its head. The military is one of the most revered institutions in the country, the Defense Department is allocated a vastly larger portion of the federal budget than her sister agencies, and an oligopoly of large private firms benefit from lucrative military contracts. The "original" meaning has been lost.

All of this is to say that the issue of abortion rests on more than the moral question, but hopefully you can see where I am going. Legal positivism is deficient even in reading original intention from the text because those intentions are bound up in normative commitments and preferences. Progressive living constitutionalism identifies the proper method but it is not oriented towards the proper ends. I, like my moral opponents (whatever they might say to the contrary), am not totally wedded either to the federalist framework or the constitution. That is an inflammatory declaration, I understand. But it is also of little matter, for I can perceive a way to get closer to my preferred ends through the tools that this framework makes available. We all can. The "majestic generalities" of the constitution make some secularized application of regula fidei possible for both sides. There is enough precedent for everyone to draw from. The winner must lay the narrative groundwork in constructing a legal regime that steps outside of the light of historical time and emerges, as if by magic, from a society of stories.

Thursday, March 3, 2022

Contra redux

This is the last thing I wish to write about, but given that I have the opportunity to speak to the former American ambassador to NATO and participant in negotiations concerning Ukraine today, it likely behooves me to add on to last week's more philosophical digression a more concrete explication of the situation as the isolationist might see it. Those of us caught up in the emotional whirlwind of current events might find it difficult to break down, in an analytical fashion, just what it is a circumspect defense of non-action might imply. So I present three separate but intertwined propositions that one might take on Ukraine as it now stands: 

P1: NATO, and particularly the US, bears the brunt of the blame for the current crisis.

P2: Notwithstanding P1, the US (and NATO) should refrain from any deeper involvement in the Russo-Ukraine war.

P3: Russia is largely justified in its decision to begin a war in the Ukraine.

Now, anyone who might take a cursory glance at these three propositions would probably settle on some consensus intuition that P1 is the easiest to defend, P3 the hardest, with P2 falling somewhere in the middle depending on your own proclivities. Fair enough. I am going to attempt to provide a rationale for all three. The matter is further complicated by the fact that these are, to some degree, a mixture of positive and normative statements that must defend themselves against both legal and moral argumentation that are themselves entwined. 

P1 finds itself in a struggle against those who resist the idea that NATO expansion precipitated the crisis. They point to the fact that NATO was under no obligation to take Russian concerns into consideration, that its expansion strengthened the security of Central and Eastern Europe in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, and that NATO-Russia cooperation was in fact very strong up until the year 2003, with diminishing returns after that. They point specifically to the Partnership for Peace (PFP) program, a NATO initiative that promotes political-economic reform within states, enhances military cooperation and capabilities, and seeks to alleviate diplomatic conflict between and within European states, usually involving the surrender of extraterritorial claims in exchange for "fast-tracking" their accession to the alliance. Fine as far as it goes, but rather meaningless when we consider that both Ukraine and Russia are part of PFP and that, by itself, this clearly did not do much to resolve territorial conflict between them. As for the rest, Poland did not find itself under threat from separatist regions in the post-war period. Czechoslovakia peacefully dissolved itself. Hungary surrendered its territorial claims to Romania, which is about the only success that this program can really claim. One must remember that NATO is a defensive alliance and that alliances are always oriented against something. In this case, the compulsion that brought these countries to entertain the PFP was not a genuine desire to resolve disputes within and between them, but to hedge against a possible future Russian threat. Small wonder, then, that Russia would view the alliance in these same terms. 

If the aim of the PFP was to build trust between states in the post-soviet world, then at worst it split that world in half and at best is ineffective at addressing matters of real sensitivity. Hungary, for instance, sought to block Ukrainian accession to NATO due to domestic laws the latter had passed restricting its substantial Hungarian minority's access to education in the Hungarian language. The PFP process, it seems, does not have any mechanisms to address this kind of backsliding. Poland and Hungary are, after all, illiberal democracies commanded by populist parties. So not only has NATO failed to incentivize the democratic reforms it claims have contributed to peace in Europe within states that have already joined the alliance (or perhaps, it is more accurate to say, liberal reforms), the logic of participation by states who partook in the post-Cold War expansion strengthens the rationale for Russian aggression against states which have not yet joined.

P2 runs up against a legal and moral argument. The legal argument points to the language of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. The Memorandum sought to relocate the Ukrainian portion of the former USSR's nuclear arsenal back to Russia in exchange for assurances against any future territorial aggrandizement. As mentioned last time, assurances are not guarantees. There are no binding treaty obligations contained within this memorandum. Ukraine is not in a formal defensive alliance with the United States. It is not a member of NATO. It hosts no American military bases. It has not even ever received the designation of major non-NATO ally. As such, one cannot argue that there are any binding legal obligations to defend Ukraine. 

The other argument is primarily moral in nature and these can be divided into two further strands. One is that American assurances were morally binding. But if this is so, there is no reason why similar assurances to Russia that were laid out in the previous post should not be similarly binding. By what criterion do we choose between assurances to adhere to and why? The other argument is that to defend Ukraine is to defend freedom, democracy, and liberty. All well and good, but the precise liberty at dispute here is Ukraine's freedom to accede to NATO. Both they and Russia see their security at stake in this decision and so we are already leaving behind the lofty language and getting at the reality of the issue, which is not of "values" but of  "interests" and so to pretend that Russia had no stake in this, that it should have just let this go when the Ukrainian Rada removes specific language in its constitution designating it a "neutral country", is absurd. To abandon neutrality implies that there are sides to pick and Ukraine made it clear which side it aimed to choose. NATO wields an effective veto over who accedes to the alliance and so to pretend they lacked agency to stop this is to simply disregard that they never took Russian interests seriously in the first place. Instead of placing Ukrainian neutrality on the negotiating table, they repeatedly issued declarations to the effect that they were working to incorporate Ukraine into the alliance. 

There are those who might also argue that the Minsk 2 agreement, signed in 2015, was highly favorable to Russia and that to implement it in accordance with the supposed Russian interpretation would be tantamount to surrendering Ukrainian sovereignty. But those who argue along this line might have trouble explaining just what is so different about an autonomous Donetsk and Luhansk from an autonomous Kosovo, which is free to conduct its own political and diplomatic relations with entities outside of Serbia. Kosovo, we may recall, was defended by NATO and its declaration of independence was welcomed by the United States, among others. Regardless of the means by which the political settlement in Minsk 2 was to be reached, it would not "break the back" of the Ukrainian state any more than Kosovo's autonomy broke Serbia's.

To defend P3 requires a history lesson in itself. But the idea goes something like this: Euromaidan, the trigger for this crisis, didn't really build a critical mass of support. The movement was largely confined to Kyiv where, not coincidentally, the Orange Revolution of 2004-2005 was carried out. Yanukovych was toppled from power but his 2010 election was monitored by the OSCE which deemed the election results free and fair. Kyiv is not all of Ukraine. A little over 1 million Ukrainians came out to demonstrate, at most, out of a total population of 44 million. That's 1/44th of the country dictating to the rest. One metropole should not dictate the country's foreign orientation to the rest of the country and should not have the power to decide whether presidents are removed via electoral means or by force. When someone like Putin calls what happened there anti-democratic, maybe the pot is calling the kettle black, but there is a real point buried in there somewhere. Kyiv's Europeanists chose, in essence, to subvert the mechanisms of procedural democracy. To westerners who retained a Cold War mindset, this was perfectly fine, and Russia's response to the violent ousting of a democratically elected government which had previously toed the line between the EU and Russia's own multilateral institutions was viewed as tyrannical and aggressive.

It would seem, given all of this, that Ukraine is actually hostage to Kyiv. Every attempt to end the conflict on reasonable terms has met with rioting and murder on the part of Kyivans. The Ukrainian state might be hopelessly corrupt, reliant as it is on a patron-client system (much as our Afghan republic was), but the cosmopolitan class in the capital has, on numerous occasions, attempted to take the destiny of the country into its own hands at the expense of the wider body politic. The results are plain to see. Ukraine has it coming. Specifically, Kyiv has it coming. If they are to make an Aleppo or Grozny of Kyiv, then so much the better for Ukraine.